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	Ma is taking control, but can Wu?
	 
	施正鋒 
	東華大學民族發展所教授兼原住民民族學院院長 
	  
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					It came as a 
					real surprise that Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) 
					was appointed to lead the Cabinet; his predecessor Liu Chao-shiuan 
					(劉兆玄) had been certain that there 
					would only be a minor reshuffle. Perhaps the size of the 
					discrepancy between public expectations and performance and 
					the need to restore public approval forced President Ma 
					Ying-jeou (馬英九) to make Liu assume 
					all responsibility for the government’s handling of Typhoon 
					Morakot. It is clear, however, that the new Cabinet line-up 
					is mediocre. Wu, formerly Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) 
					secretary-general, prevailed over Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強), 
					so the potentially popular triumvirate of Ma, Vice Premier 
					Eric Chu (朱立倫) and Hu did not 
					materialize. But the well-regarded Chu is likely the one 
					whom Ma wants to nurture as successor. The only reasonable 
					explanation for the sudden choice of Wu is that Ma wanted 
					him to cover for Chu, especially since it is uncertain that 
					the KMT — even with its hands on government resources — will 
					do well in city and county elections at the end of the year. 
 The Nantou-born Wu has served as legislator, county 
					commissioner and even mayor of a special municipality 
					(Kaohsiung). He missed out only on running for provincial 
					governor. Historical experience shows that serving as either 
					Taipei or Kaohsiung mayor is a precursor to becoming premier 
					and even president.
 
 Although Wu lacks experience in the central government, he 
					is the only suitable candidate among the pan-blue political 
					elite, apart from People First Party (PFP) Chairman James 
					Soong (宋楚瑜), who performed well 
					during his time as provincial governor, and KMT Chairman Wu 
					Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄).
 
 However, whether one views the new Cabinet as 
					“election-oriented” or as one that “fills the cracks,” the 
					line-up indicates that Wu has limited influence over 
					personnel arrangements; some Cabinet members were even 
					retained at the president’s request. This points to the 
					transitional nature of Wu’s premiership.
 
 So, besides the power of appointment over the heads of the 
					Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
					Mainland Affairs Council, Ma has a decisive say over the 
					appointment of other portfolios that are traditionally the 
					realm of the premier. The new Cabinet is thus an extension 
					of Ma’s personnel strategy during his two terms as Taipei 
					mayor. With his original cadres staying on, Ma has grabbed 
					the opportunity to put his people in charge of the eight key 
					ministries.
 
 If former minister of foreign affairs Francisco Ou (歐鴻鍊) 
					was replaced because he was out of the loop and former 
					minister of national defense Chen Chao-min (陳肇敏) 
					stepped down because of his handling of disaster relief, the 
					replacement of former minister of education Cheng Jei-cheng 
					(鄭瑞城) is not so easily explained. 
					It seemed that Cheng lost his job because he smiled while 
					inspecting schools in disaster zones — something that was 
					shown on pan-green broadcast media outlets. But the real 
					reason was his unwillingness to listen to pan-blue-camp 
					legislators. Accusations that he was “light green” or not 
					“blue” enough were just pretexts for his dismissal.
 
 Former Research, Development and Evaluation Commission 
					chairman Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺) had 
					planned on returning to academia, but he was retained by Ma 
					and put in charge of the Ministry of the Interior.
 
 Under late president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), 
					the interior ministry was in charge of police, household 
					registration, social clubs and religious matters, but it was 
					also the ministry with the most complicated duties and the 
					least respect. With ethnic balance in mind, this portfolio 
					was retained for Taiwanese politicians.
 
 When the Democratic Progressive Party took power, Mainlander 
					academics took the portfolio based on similar 
					considerations.
 
 When Ma assumed office, he had Taiwanese take over foreign 
					affairs-related portfolios because the premier was a 
					Mainlander. His latest move to control the interior 
					ministry, however, reflects his ambition to suppress local 
					factions.
 
 If academics in their ivory towers struggle to show sympathy 
					for the public, then politicians tend to be characterized by 
					their affection for the ordinary voter. It is often the case 
					that civil servants-turned-political appointees are 
					incapable of shouldering responsibilities despite their 
					expertise. Compared with the previous “academic Cabinet,” 
					some are calling the new line-up a “public opinion” Cabinet 
					because Wu and Chu began their political careers through 
					election.
 
 However, the majority of Cabinet members remain technical 
					experts. If Ma has control over KMT headquarters, then the 
					biggest challenge for the loquacious premier will come from 
					the legislature.
 
 Before resigning, Liu said: “God bless the Republic of 
					China; God bless the people of Taiwan.”
 
 This suggests that Wu will be needing the blessing of his 
					compatriots.
 
					
					    
					  
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