Three days before
the first anniversary of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九)
presidency, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other
pro-independence groups organized anti-government protests
in Taipei and Kaohsiung, followed by a 24-hour sit-in in
Taipei.
The Taipei
demonstration moved along four different routes, each with a
different theme: Protecting sovereignty; protecting Taiwan;
protecting the disadvantaged; and combating unemployment.
This placed the focus of the protests on the government’s
inability to turn the economy around, while presenting the
problem as the result of the government’s pro-China economic
policies.
However — and this may have been the result of
behind-the-scene assistance from China — between Mother’s
Day and the Dragon Boat Festival, the Taiwanese stock market
has made gains, temporarily easing some of the complaints
from the middle class.
Perhaps because the government is deliberately being vague
about the contents of an economic agreement with China, or
that it has used domestic opposition as a bargaining chip,
but complaints that Taiwan’s sovereignty is being sacrificed
— be it through a closer economic partnership arrangement, a
comprehensive economic cooperation agreement or an economic
cooperation framework agreement — have been handled by
Minister of Economic Affairs Yiin Chii-ming (尹啟銘),
while Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai-Shin-yuan (賴幸媛)
has made only rare appearances.
The result is that the arguments of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union have
not gained momentum, forcing them to focus on a referendum.
Likewise, the government has dealt with criticism from
non-governmental organizations of the government’s proposed
revisions to the revised Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法)
by saying that the previous DPP government did not oppose
the act.
In addition, Ma has personally given instructions that the
law must be amended to restrict the discretionary rights of
police, thus showing his concern while putting the ball
firmly in the legislature’s court and depriving the
opposition of an opportunity to further play up the issue.
Furthermore, when DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)
made a grand gesture of being ready to risk arrest during
the sit-in, she allowed Ma to turn the political spotlight
on the issue of public order.
In addition to the DPP’s mobilization of supporters and
gradually intensifying resistance, the greatest significance
of the anti-Ma protest on his 100th day in office on Aug.
30, the large anti-Ma protest on Oct. 25 and the
anti-government protest on May 17 is that they were
organized by pro-Taiwanese organizations, which now rival
the DPP in strength and have retaken the initiative in
social movements.
Although these organizations may have appeared to be
competing with the DPP, the detention of former president
Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁)
seems to have given rise to a compromise between the two,
whereby each will follow its own path to avoid putting
officials in the south in a difficult situation. When former
DPP chairman Yu Shyi-kun traveled south, it was probably to
determine how much people there wanted to distance
themselves from the DPP.
Thanks to widespread support, Tsai has managed to enlist the
assistance of former DPP chairman Frank Hsieh (謝長廷)
and the party’s former Welfare State Alliance faction. As a
result, she no longer has to worry about internal
opposition, including occasional annoyances in connection
with Chen.
Although Tsai’s earlier awkwardness and shyness is gone, her
speeches remain less than inspiring, which no amount of
background noise can remedy. Nevertheless, the whole
festival-like protest was obviously aimed at confirming her
leadership.
Given this situation, the main point of the protest as far
as the DPP is concerned was probably to prepare for the
year-end mayoral and county commissioner elections.
On one hand, DPP leaders were probably wondering how much
mobilizing power their former public servants still
commanded, while on the other, they probably sought to
determine if they could reawaken interest among
disillusioned supporters.
The real competition, however, took place during the
overnight sit-in following the protest. This extra
performance only came about at the insistence of
pro-Taiwanese organizations and is probably something the
DPP could have done without. Since it had to support other
organizations, the party could not remain at arm’s length
and had to provide a few hardline speeches.
However, having allowed the DPP to use the more convenient
gathering points by the MRT stations, the non-governmental
organizations were not willing to let the DPP order them
around and joined the sit-in on Ketagalan Boulevard.
Despite the DPP’s intensifying tactics, the government still
appears to be in control. Maybe because it can fall back on
state resources, it seems confident of victory in the
year-end elections and unaffected by public criticism.
In the short term, Ma might be able to defend himself
against the DPP by meeting each attack, but in the long run,
arrogance will be the first step toward his defeat. The
question is what will happen if the DPP wins the year-end
elections.
Shih Cheng-feng is dean of the College of Indigenous Studies
at National Dong Hwa University.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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