Taiwan’s
Foreign Policy toward China:
An Assessment of the Chen Shui-bian Administration*
Attitudes toward China
Cheng-Feng Shih
Associate Professor, Tamkang University
2001/8/10
Introduction
The victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) candidate Chen Shui-bian（陳水扁）in the second
presidential election in March 2000 seemed to take most Taiwan watchers in
surprise. What struck us most are Chen’s
reconciliatory attitudes toward China in his inauguration speech on May 20th,
2000, by appealing for the so-called “Five No’s （五不）”
principle , that is, no declaring independence, no change of state title, no
constitutional revision to institutionalize the "Two States Discourse （兩國論）" of former President Lee Teng-hui, no plebiscite for Taiwan's future, and no
abolishing the "Guidelines for National Unification （國家統一綱領）."
Furthermore, in his millennium speech on the New Year's Eve last year,
President Chen pledged to embark on economic and cultural integrations with
China, and to seek for a framework for perpetual peace and eventual political
integration across the strait of Taiwan. The next day, he dauntlessly broke up
the DPP taboo and brought up the idea of "One China under the Constitution
of the Republic of China（憲法一中）."
Recalling how Chen had bitterly assailed former DPP chairman Hsu Hsin-lian’s （許信良） policy of “Bold Expedition
Westwards （大膽西進）” in the mid-1990s, we
wonder what factors have contributed his drastic change of mind.
In this study, we will start with a brief
review of the evolution of the DPP's attitudes toward China, and then sketch
Chen's formal positions from a candidate to the president-elected. In order to
explain his changing courses, if any, variables drawn from three levels of
analysis will be examined. At the systemic level, we will look into whether
Chen has had any particular perceptive regarding the changing order of the
international system, and whether some external factors have had exerted any
influence on his perceptions. Secondly, our focus will move to three domestic
factors, especially the evolving party system, factional politics within the
DPP, and dubious national identity at the level of state/society. At the
individual level, Chen’s personal idiosyncratic characteristics will be
examined, especially his pragmatic style. Finally, we will endeavor to offer
some tentative conclusions to assess the potency of these contending or
complimentary factors.
The Ruling DPP: Maintaining The Status Quo
As a political party whose leaders were determined to take over the regime from
the Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese Party, or KMT, 國民黨), the DPP had from the beginning
focused on domestic affairs and managed to stay away from external affairs,
which were deemed to have little electoral payoff. While the party program,
promulgated in November 1986, has called for ending confrontation across the
strait, substantive policy did not appear until October 1987 when the Central
Executive Committee passed a resolution appealing for liberalizing cross-strait
communication. At that time, however, the act was mainly interpreted as
intended to embarrass the KMT government, if not to woo the ethnic Mainlander
voter, by challenging its long-standing ban on homecoming for Mainlander
veterans to China; and the MKT was forced to lift the ban one month
later.
Under the chairmanship of Huang Hsin-jie （黃信介）, the Central
Executive Committee passed a resolution in 1989 demanding the liberalization of
the so-called "Three Links（三通）" between Taiwan
and China, that is direct post（通郵）, direct transport （通航）, and direct trade（通商）. It is believed that the
preempted government was thus forced to pass the "Guidelines for National
Unification" eventually in 1991. Until the mid-1990, the DPP had showed
little interest in the so-called "Mainland affairs（大陸事務） ."
It was not until 1995 when the DPP was
prepared for the candidate selection for the coming presidential election that
former DPP chairman Hsu Hsin-lian (1995) boldly proposed
a policy of “Bold Expedition Westwards" in order to gain from the
participation in Chinese economic development. In the spirit of
Neo-functionalism provided in the International Political Economy literature,
moreover, Hsu argued that economic cooperation would lower the propensity for
political confrontation across the strait. It was further believed that the
rationale behind his radical change of course was , in part, due to mounting
pressure from those Taiwanese businessmen（台商）supporters
who hoped to benefit from lower costs under direct links. During the DPP
presidential primary then, Hsu was accused by his competitor Peng Min-ming（彭明敏）as so naïve, if not treacherous,
as to deceive himself that politics and economy were detachable.
To be sure, the DPP had had no China
policy per se from the start except for within the general framework for the
future status of Taiwan. In other words, China policy was originally hidden in
the other side of the coin of the agenda for Taiwan Independence. When those
Taiwanese exiles who were agitators of Taiwan Independence resolved to break
the official black list and to smuggle themselves in from abroad, the DPP
hastily inserted a so-called “Taiwan Independence Clause” (台獨黨綱, thereafter TIC) to its Party
Program in 1991, pledging to "establish a sovereign independent Republic
of Taiwan" only if under four circumstances . Nonetheless, the DPP had
ever since been ambivalent to the TIC after its setback in the 1991 election of
National Assembly. As more and more DPP elites had come to concur with the
media-made perception that the clause was a poison for elections and thus the
major barrier on the road to take over the government, they ceaselessly
demanded for its revision or even removal.
To prepare for the coming 2000
presidential election, the DPP held a show forum for sentencing the fate of the
TIC in the early 1998. Managing to synthesize the major ingredients of the two
debating camps, nevertheless, the DPP came with a new slogan "Moving Westwards
[to China] while Strengthen the Base [in Taiwan]（強本西進）."
One year before the presidential election, to evade the question of Taiwan's
future, the DPP passed a "Taiwan's Future Resolution（台灣前途決議案） " at its semiannual
convention in May 1999, and formally affirmed that "Taiwan is [already] a
independent sovereign state." Meanwhile, it
appears that the party elites have reached the consensus that Taiwan
unofficially has declared its independence at least in the first presidential
election in 1996, even though some would argue that Taiwan’s independence had
been heralded in the 1991 election of the National Assembly, or in the 1992
election of the Legislature .
With the TIC still intact, the DPP,
however unwillingly, still has to uphold the inexplicit principle of "One
Taiwan and One China （一台一中）"
sanctified by its pro-independence supporters, although these elements have
been in the minority within the party in terms of membership in the Central
Executive Committee, in the Central Committee, and in the Legislature. As long
as the KMT is replaced and its political power is deprived, most DPP elites
seem happy to maintain the status quo within the political framework of the
Republic of China. Reacting the KMT's recent "Confederation Discourse（邦聯論）," some DPP legislators went
so far to welcome this quasi "Two Chinas" formula （兩個中國）by arguing that something
rejected by both China and Taiwan Independence supporters must be fine.
Chen Shui-bian's
Positions
In all appearance, the agenda of Chen Shui-bian's
China policy, at least for the first term, is to stabilize cross-strait
relations in short of Chinese incorporation of Taiwan. With this priority on
mind, anything lying between resuming official talks and negotiating a peace
treaty with China would be considered a better sign of progress than the
current deadlock. Since China has uncompromisingly insisted that Taiwan accept
the so-called "One China Principle（一中原則）," meanwhile, measures have
been taken to loosen regulations on direct trade with China. Chen even has
ventured out to suggest forging some political integration between Taiwan and
China.
As early as 1991, Chen Shui-bian,
as legislator, coined the term of "One Country, Two States（一國兩國 ）,"
meaning "Two Divided States within One Cultural Chinese Country（一個文化中國、兩個分治中國）." This
seemingly "Two Chinas" concept was repeatedly echoed during the
presidential campaign. When facing pro-independence supporters, such vaguely
provoking expression as "One State on Each Side [of the strait]（一邊一國）" would be uttered. On the
other hand, while attempting to appease China, a more reconciliatory usage
"Two Chinese States（兩個華人國家）" would be
employed to characterize the status quo between Taiwan and China. In essence,
both terms imply that Taiwan and China do not belong to, or rule over, each
other.
When then President Lee Teng-hui unleashed the "Two States Discourse"
interviewed by German journalists in July 1999, arguing that Constitutional
amendments since 1991 had designated cross strait relations as "a special
state-to-state relationship （特殊的國與國關係）," it was
believed that his purpose was to set the limit for future president's China
policy. Chen Shui-bian must have been initially
caught off guard since he was ready to move to the presumed central ground in
order to garner Lee's native supporters within the KMT. While concurring with
Lee’s “Two States discourse," he forged a nearly
alike phrase "special relationship between the [two] states（國與國的特殊關係）." By critically assailing
the notion of a confederation with China hinted by Lien Chan（連戰） , candidate of the KMT, Chen
thus created the impression that he was the authentic heir to Lee.
On the economic side, however, Chen not
only made a more aggressive attack on the KMT's neo-Mercantilist policy of
"Retraining Hasty Investment [in China]（戒急用忍）"
proclaimed in 1996, but also advocated liberalizing the Three Links by
proposing "One-Way [direct transportation] at Designated Ports（單向定點直航）." While promising to
provide "creating thinking" on this matter, his major rationale was
nothing but "to lowering operational costs," which had long been
suggested by former DPP chair Hsu Hsin-lian and now a
nonpartisan presidential candidate. In the minimum, methodical efforts were
made to speedy the liberalization of direct links with China at the end of 2000
in a form of so-called "Mini Three Links（小三通）
" at Quemoy（金門）.
By ostensibly distancing himself from Lien
in terms of economic exchange with China and by identifying himself with Lee in
terms of asserting Taiwan's de facto separation with China, Chen seemed to have
created an image that he had successfully stick to his "New Central Line（新中間路線）," which was said to have
borrowed from Tony Blair's "Third Way." However,
it is still not clear what his vision of Taiwan's future relations with China
would be. Once in power, President Chen wasted no time in soothing China that
it is no matter whether federation, confederation, or commonwealth is laid on
the table as long as "One China（一個中國）"
is not the dictated principle. He went so far so to pay tribute to the idea of
confederation as "provocatively creative" and thus a reason for
"vast political space for discussion."
Endeavoring to defuse the anticipated rising tension from China during regime
change for the first year of his administration, Chen seemed to have given the
every appearance to appease China at all costs. Various rhetorical attempts
have been made to willingly accommodate, if not to compromise on, the framework
of “One China” formula imposed by China, such as the anxious appeal for
immediate retrogression to the oxymoron "One China, Defined
Respectively" (一個中國、各自表述) , "Two Chinese
States," or "Constitutional One China."
Finally, to the disappoint of his staunch
pro-independence supporters, Chen proclaimed his “Five No’s” in the
inaugurating address in May 2000, and further declared to search for some form
of eventual political integration with China within certain framework for
perpetual peace through economic and cultural integrations in his New Year's
Eve speech last year.
In private, however, Chen was said to
repeatedly assure pro-independence opinion leaders that he would not abandon
their line and deviate from his own electoral promises. He also reminded them
to examine the premise he had laid out for the "Five No's," that is
"if the Chinese Communists are not disposed to resort to arms [on
Taiwan]." In other words, since it is highly unlikely that China would
oblige itself not to attack Taiwan, his own assurances to China are nothing but
diplomatically empty words, probably to assure the US, and, of course, the
world, that Taiwan is by no means a troublemaker.
Domestically, President Chen has yet to
reconcile himself with the externally stigmatized and yet nominally enshrined TIC
in the party program. By sidestepping the issue of Taiwan's future relations
with China, the best he could afford is to persistently argue away that the TIC
is essentially not an "Independence" clause but rather a
"Referendum" one, and hence that there is no such an issue to deal
with at all. Nevertheless, since procedural referendum/plebiscite promisedby Chen (and the DPP) as the ultimately warranty to
the right to self-determination is not equal to substantive policy commitment
to the voters, Chen, as the Chief Executive and the Head of the State, needs to
be more specific on future relations to be engaged with China.
Some Explanatory Variables
External Factors
As an island state caught in the middle of the intricate relationships between
the US, and China , Taiwan has the very reason to
adjust its foreign policy against the structural conditions delineated by its
neighboring giants. In a nutshell, the supreme goal of Taiwan's foreign affairs
after the war has been to ally itself with the US in its defense against
outright forceful incorporation by China. More bluntly, the utmost priority for
foreign policy makers in Taiwan is inescapably to break through the global
diplomatic isolation coercively orchestrated by China, so that national security
may be ensured. It is not exaggerated to say that Taiwan's foreign policy is
fundamentally defense policy. In this section, we shall start with the
discussion of Taiwan's relations with the US and then those with China.
For most political elites in Taiwan, the
international system seems equivalent to the US . The
foreign relations between the US and Taiwan for the past five decades have
largely been asymmetric. Based on the Structural Realist perspective of Kenneth
Waltz (1979), we have shown elsewhere that the dyadic US-Taiwan interaction may
be treated as one link of the regional US-China-Taiwan triangle in East Asia,
which in turns had been dependent on the configuration of the global
US-USSR-China triangle until the later 1990s until the later 1990s (Shih,
1999a). When the structure of the global system changed, manifested in terms of
the realignment of the three Powers, the parts had to adjust themselves in
order to preserve their own interests; and these adjustments in turns led to
structural changes in the regional sub-system whence the units in the
sub-system again needed to rearrange their positions .
The Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) , promulgated in 1979, had been the watershed of American
policy toward Taiwan for the past twenty years. Before the TRA, Taiwan had long
been treated as but one component of the American global strategic thinking to
counter the PRC. Thereafter, the US has been more inclined to look at its
separate relations with Taiwan detached from China, although American
considerations from the beginning have to be constrained by Chinese claim of
Taiwan’s territory in their mutual pursuit of accommodation. With the demise of
the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s, the importance of China as an American
counterweight against the USSR began to fade away. At the regional level, thus,
it appeared that the US would be less willing to compromise on the Taiwan issue
with China. In reality, under the TRA, the relations between the US and Taiwan
have been amount to a quasi-alliance in short of the status of free association
in the last two decades.
Seeking a constructive strategic
partnership with China in the short term, Bill Clinton’s strategy of
“Comprehensive Engagement” in the post-Cold War era had essentially followed his
former administrations’ footsteps. It is understandable that Clinton was no
more willing to upgrade American relations with Taiwan than any presidents for
fear of offending China . Still, it was Clinton who
sent Nimitz and Independence to deter China during the 1995-96 Missile Crises,
testifying again that the security of Taiwan as guaranteed in the TRA would
outweigh other policy considerations . Also, strangely
enough, while none of the presidential candidates in Taiwan had demonstrated
their willingness to counter Chinese intimidation during the presidential
campaigns, only the US had stood firm lonely to reprimand Chinese distasteful
impudence. Asserting unwaveringly that only the Taiwanese had the right to
decide their future, American President Bill Clinton
had come near declaring his determination to safeguard their right to national
self-determination.
Of course, to the dismay of Taiwan, the
most devastating punch so far came from the “Three No’s” during Clinton’s visit
in China in summer 1998 . At noted by the Clinton
administration, the “Three No’s” had been deposited in the Three Communiqués
with China. Nonetheless, while Clinton’s predecessors would at best acknowledge
the Chinese position “that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of
China,” the blunt, if not reckless, Clinton administration was more ready to
recognize it. The strongest phrases ever used by the US in the past was that
“[the US] has no intention of … pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘One
China,’” rather than the explicit expression that “[the US] does not support”
an independent Taiwan . It looked as if Clinton's
interpretation of the “One China Policy” had broken the intended ambiguity
veiled in the three Communiqués with China. It would be safe to summarize that
the US has long chosen to keep all options open to be decided by Taiwan and
China themselves since 1979. Still, while former presidents would prefer the
status quo and refrain from becoming a self-acclaimed mediator between China
and Taiwan, Clinton seemed content to encourage, if not to drive, Taiwan to
resume dialogue with China .
After the war, Chinese foreign policy
toward Taiwan has been undergoing dramatic changes, from the threat of using
force to liberate Taiwan, and to the appeal of using negotiations for peaceful
reunification since its rapprochement with the United States in 1979. On the
same day when China normalized its relations with the US, a "Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan（告台灣同胞書） " was proclaimed
by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, appealing
for the resumption of "Three Links and Four Flows（三通四流）" between the two parties.
In September 1981, Ye Jianying （葉劍英）, chairman of the above-mentioned
body, made public a "Nine-Point Proposal for Peaceful Unification （葉九條） ," offering the
establishment of a "Special Administrative Region" for Taiwan after
unification .
While meeting with British Prime Minister
Thatcher in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping （鄧小平）presented
the seemingly tempting arrangement of "One Country, Two Systems（一國兩制）, " which has mainly laid
down the general framework to lure Taiwan into its arms in the future. Li Xiannian（李先念）, then Chinese
President, went so far as to suggest that Taiwan retain its systems of party,
police, military, and even secret police in March 1985,.
Just as the US has intentionally been
vague regarding whether or not to protect, if not to send troops to Taiwan, in
case that China invades the island after Taiwan formally declares independence,
China has similarly hesitated to promise that it would resolve its differences
with Taiwan without resorting to arms . From Chinese President Jiang Zemin's "Eight Points（江八點）
" in 1995 to Vice Premier Qian Quchen's recent "Seven Measures（錢七項） ," the Chinese message has
been clear to the Taiwanese: under the precondition of
"One China," accept "One Country, Two Systems" as such a
special region as Hong Kong.
Basically a domestic president who would give priority to domestic affairs over
foreign ones, it is not at all clear how Chen has reacted to the
above-mentioned external, if not systemic, constraints. Compared to Lien Chan
and James Soong（宋楚瑜）, both of whom
received their Ph.D.'s in the US, Chen, educated in Taiwan, had no previous
connections with the US. As presidential candidate of the DPP, an opposition
party that had so far lacked experience and expertise in foreign affairs, in
order to pose itself as a responsible ruling party, Chen must have felt the
urge to convince the US that he would be trustworthy. His amateurism must have
led him the conviction that the US was opposed to Taiwan's de jure independence
after his visit to the US in April 1999 .
Although the US had aspired to allude to
some interim agreement, or modus operandi, between Taiwan and China ,
especially during Clinton's second term, it was debatable whether the message
was so strong as to suggest Taiwan enter into political integration with China.
Up till this moment, it is still not clear whether Chen had the "Taiwan
Card" on his mind, but such an imprudent response to court China was bound
to draw backfire from the US unless some undeclared understanding had been
conveyed by the former administration.
Domestic Factors
1. Volatile Party
System and Policy Convergence
In the past fifteen years, the party system in Taiwan has evolved from a party-
state system where no democratic party was allowed, through an one-party
dominant system where the ruling KMT was challenged by the opposition DPP, and
into a competitive multiparty system where no party is able to score a solid
majority of the votes in both legislative and presidential elections. The
electoral bases of these parties can be roughly attributed to ethnic identity
(native Taiwanese vs. Mainlanders), national identity (Taiwanese vs. Chinese),
and attitudes towards the issue of independence and unification. As the three
axes of these cleavages tended to converge, the political space of the major
parties could, until the late 1990s, be arranged along a spectrum ranging from
the New Party （NP, 新黨）on the extreme end of
pro-unification/Mainlanders, through the KMT occupying the middle ground of the
status quo/Mainlanders-native Taiwanese coalition, and to the DPP at the edge
of pro-independence/native Taiwanese. So far, three parties have broken away
from the KMT for different reasons. While the dwarfish anti-Lee NP is being
absorbed by the new-formed People First Party （PFP,
親民黨） led by James Soong
after the presidential election, a Taiwan United Alliance（TUA, 台灣團結聯盟） is being organized by some
native Taiwanese defectors and followers of Lee along with some supporter of Peng.
What broke the four-decade of the KMT party state impasse was the unexpected
succession to the presidency by Lee Teng-hui after
Chiang Chin-kuo's sudden demise in 1988. To avoid
regime breakdown in the global third wave of democratization, Lee embarked on
political liberalization and democratization in a piecemeal fashion.
Anticipating the first direct presidential election in 1996, Lee rushed to
undertake the process of naturalizing his party as well as the regime , by promoting native elites to the ruling echelon.
As expected, native voters began swaying to the partially naturalized KMT, one
lateral seceding party that had strategically occupied the middle of the ground.
Right from its inception in 1986, the DDP
has been clothed in three integral parts: anti-KMT sentiments in the form of
social reforms, anti-Mainlander ethnic nationalism, and Taiwanese nationalism
(or Taiwan Independence Movement). As its electoral bases were progressively
eroded by the born-again KMT under Lee, the call for party transformation in
terms of revising the TIC had long been in the air among the DPP elites. While
engulfed in the disarray of party identification, few options were available.
For one thing, since Lee is a native Taiwanese, anti-KMT for its sake did not
seem electively rewarding unless Lee would step down from the chairmanship.
Since playing ethnic card by resorting to ethnic mobilization in elections was
morally proscribed, at least in the public sphere, the last political space to
traverse would be on China policy. However, after Lee proposed his "Two
States Discourse" in 1999, the best the DPP could count on was to
emphasize Chen's personal merits while praying that Lien and Soong would not
run as a team.
As early as the third legislative election
in 1995, reckoning on voter dealignment and possible
party realignment, most candidates had purposely minimized their own party
affiliations. Five years later, likewise, all presidents hopeful have, right
from the beginning, had managed to downplay the issue of China policy at the
national level for fear of detonating any mine. While Soong's adviser Sau Chong-hai (邵宗海) contended that whoever focuses
his campaign attention on the mainland issue was destine to lose, Chiu Yee-jen (邱義仁) from Chen's camp
also expressed similar attitudes . After the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP)
had failed to obtain enough signatures for its presidential nominee, Chen felt
confident to wage massive retreat from the traditional DPP's China policy
assertively as we have described earlier.
KMT's candidate Lien Chan was not faring
comfortably either. As the most favorite son and heir apparent to President
Lee, Lien had long been fretting over his poor performance in polls ever since
a briefly momentary ascent after the 921 earthquake in 1999. Struggling to walk
out of the underscore laid down by Lee's momentous "Two States
Discourse," Lien once ventured out to initiate a referendum law, in short
of plebiscite, in obscurely amicable efforts to woo some native
pro-independence voters. However, in order to lure pro-unification supporters
from James Soong and the NP to render strategic voting, the panic Lien wasted
no time undertaking his own strategic withdrawal from President Lee's line, and
hastily indicated his eagerness to enter into the second phase of the almost
forgotten Guidelines for National Unification toward unification without
obtaining even any nominal concession from the part of China. A short-lived
trial balloon of a confederation of China and Taiwan was also briefly disclosed
in the hope to distance himself from Lee.
Initially, Soong had probed into the
possibility to win over the support from the pro-independence camp. Having been
summarily dismissed as an ethnic Mainlander, however, the KMT defector's only
option without partisan endorsement was to play down China policy and not to
offer any opportunity to be charged as a fifth column of China. Later on, while
engulfed in the aftershock of the campaign finance scandal disclosed at the
zenith of his support rates, he had to be much more cautious on China policy.
Although his "Quasi-state Relationship" theory had been coarsely
misread and thus blasted for relegating Taiwan's status to a quasi-state, the
notion of "mutually exclusive sovereignty" in the form of the
European Union was no more objectionable than the others'.
Meanwhile, as all three major presidential
candidates were busy appeasing to China, there was an irony circulating in
private: while James Soong endeavored to keep distance from the issue of
"Unification," and Lien Chan managed to stay away from the intriguing
words "One China," Chen Shue-bian similarly
appeared embarrassed in the slightest chitchat of "Independence."
Flocking together toward the mythical center, the three presidents hopeful
posed themselves as if the only trustworthy defenders of the status quo.
2. Factional Politics of the DPP
Factional politics is the most conspicuous
character of the DPP. To understand the DPP thoroughly is to look into the
complicated maneuvering of factional politics from within or even without. This
lack of organizational cohesion may account for its outward policy
inconsistency.
As a loose anti-KMT coalition, the party
has been made up of factions based on patronage-clientalism
and personal loyalty to leaders, networks of personal connections and
generational cohorts, and partially on ideological differences. From the early
Formosa （美麗島）vs. New Movement（NM, 新潮流） bipolar competitions to recent
five-faction configuration , the strength of each faction has been roughly
measured according to the size of its seats in the Legislature. The winning
coalition would usually be rewarded the chairmanship and appointments of the
department chiefs at the party headquarter every other years. Although the
party chairmanship has been shifted from faction to faction periodically, it is
the minor and yet well-disciplined NM that has almost been on the winning
coalition longer than other factions, even the largest faction, from the start,
as the Liberal Democrats have in Germany.
In general, major party issues, such as
rules of candidate selection, revisions of party Program （黨綱）or Charter（黨章）, or substantive policy
positions, would be decided in the routine meeting of the Central Executive
Committee（中常會）, where factions would
calculate options available in terms of market segmentation in the coming
electoral competition. When the issue is deferred to the semiannual or special
Convention of Party Representatives（黨員代表大會）,
it would be either due to failure to arrive at some consensus among the party
elites, or to the fact that the issue is so critical that formal endorsement
from the rank and file is warranted.
Policy polemics has been one manifestation
of factional competition. Usually, factional differences would be expediently
arranged as a black-and-white dichotomous debate. Before rival factions decide
to take their position and join any coalition, they would ascertain how to
protect their territory, at least, and to expand their sphere of influence, at
most. While balance of power has been the golden rule of intra-party games, the
contest has been adversely waged not so much as between Formosa and NM than an
ad hoc anti-NM coalition and NM . Roughly speaking, if
there had been two tines or tendencies, one was the emphasis on economic
activities, and the other on political and social reforms. Further
investigations would illuminate that those disparate points of concentration
also arose from contrastive constituencies. While Formosa started with an
amalgamation of anti-KMT figures at the local level, NM was initially made up
of some young Turks with socialist and nationalist sentiments. While Formosa
would seek financial support from disgruntle native Taiwanese businessmen, NM
would pattern its strategies after social and somewhat national
movements.
In appearance, the two lines seemed
contradictory. In reality, nevertheless, they did share some commonalities at
least until the early 1990s, that is, the ouster of the KMT as an alien regime.
However, when the native Lee sped up his project of naturalization, if not
demolition, of the KMT, the DPP elites were seriously divided over the proper
course to steer for. When Hsu of Formosa brought up the idea of “Bold
Expedition Westwards" in 1995 to guard against Lee's official nationalism,
he was mercilessly denounced as no less than a traitor against the Taiwanese.
Aptly recognizing the steadfast encroachment by Lee Teng-hui's
line of "Independent Taiwan（獨台）" under the
umbrella of the Republic of China on Taiwan, the quarrelsome factions finally
mended their differences and achieved a consensus on China policy in 1998, that
is, "Moving Westwards while Strengthen the Base."
Until now, a sense of crisis would compel
the antagonist factions to terminate internal rivalry, at least, not in public.
Not to mention their pseudo antitheses in the contest over political space in
national elections. This opportunist strategy of division-of-labor is bound to
stay, given the imperative under the unique single nontransferable vote (SNTV)
electoral system. It remains to be seen whether factional politics would fade
away as Chen has controlled the state apparatus and decided to stand aloof from
the DPP. Recently, the DPP held a series of moot courts on some issues,
including the now heavily promoted "Confederation Discourse" of the
KMT. Without knowing President Chen's attitude beforehand, playing safe seems
to the best policy for the factions.
So far, the most serious, but not urgent,
internal challenge comes from the newly elected party chair Fran Hsieh（謝長廷）, leader of the Welfare State
Faction and Chen’s only competitor in his cohort for
the past decade. By forging a winning coalition with the NM after the
presidential election, his former foe, Hsieh recurrently urged the president to
consider his successor in the future. He went so far as to drop a hint that
Chen might not be nominated for the reelection if Chen disregarded the
anti-nuke clause in the party program. Having been preempted by Hsieh on China
policy from time to time, Chen seems to have lost a solid party behind him on
his navigation into the imagined central ground.
3. Dubious National Identity and Ethnic
Cleavages
National identity and ethnic identity in
Taiwan are highly coterminous with each other . On the
one hand, one's ethnic identity (native Taiwanese or Mainlander) would largely
decide one's national identity (Taiwanese or Chinese) and hence one's attitudes
toward the issue of Taiwan's future (independence or unification). On the other
hand, one's ethnic identity is also composed of one's conception of national
identity and/or Taiwan's relations with China in the future, especially for the
Mainlander. So far, these cleavages have by and large explained voters' party
identification in Taiwan.
Right from its inception in 1986, the DPP
has been largely perceived as "the" Taiwanese party, read the ethnic,
if not nationalist, party for the native Taiwanese. On the other extreme of the
continuum of ethnic identity, the NP would be considered as an extricating
Mainlander party, formed in 1993 by some anti-Lee conservatives who would
consider themselves as the authentic KMT. The KMT would have safely retained
the central ground as a mechanism of ethnic consociation between the Taiwanese
and the Mainlanders. As the trinity of ideology-leader-state began to wither
away under Lee's presidency, especially from 1995 on, the Mainlanders needed to
define their ethnic identity, national identity, and party identification. As
the PFP is becoming a new Zion for the Mainlanders, Soong has made all efforts
to make it a non-ethnic party by engaging in coalition formation with native politicians,
which makes its location along the ethnic spectrum difficult. Finally, as the
KMT is reasserting its pro-unification stance in order to fence off Soong's
snatch, some native adherents of Lee's line within the KMT have made up their
minds to set up the TUA. While the splinter TUA pledges to sit between the DPP
and the KMT, some pro-independence activists are anxious to throw themselves
upon.
Intertwined with these ethnic clouds are
confusing national identities. After forty years of orthodox education imposed
by the KMT, who claimed to the sole legitimate descent of the Chinese lineage ,
it is no wonder that the majority of the Taiwanese are still not certain if
they and the Chinese belong to the so-called Chinese nation (中華民族) or not . While the simplest
acid test would be whether they have a mind to share one Chinese nation-state,
most people in Taiwan tend to accept a primordial conception of national identity . No wonder that politicians in Taiwan seem
reluctant to walk out of the cloud of identity crisis. Giving the fact that
both Lien Chan and James Soong were both born in China, it is not surprising
for them to claim they are ethnic Chinese (中國人);
however, they would rush to claim themselves Taiwanese
as well politically.
As the DPP elites are now plainly willing
to illuminate Chinese nation as cultural one and disregard its political,
historical, or geographic meanings, it is no wonder the native-born Chen would
agree that both Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China
(PRC) are two Chinese states. By so doing, Chen and the DPP feel comfortable to
take over the ROC state apparatus from Lee. Moreover, Chen is ready to consider
himself as a Chinese (華人) probably having a
mind to appease China, and to tranquilize the Mainlanders.
To be fair, the DPP has never undisguisedly confronted the goal independence, although
some would denounce its supporter as fundamentalists without reservation. What
worries the DPP elites most is that independence has excluded other policy
options, such as “Two Chinas,” “Chinese Commonwealth,” or “Two States in One
Nation.” However, the posture of “Two Chinas,” in whatever forms, would run
risk of being misperceived by the international society as romantic Taiwanese
irredentism with China. Secondly, it is doubtful whether China would accept a
formula in opposition to its staunch “One China” policy. And thirdly, in the
home front, the designation of Chinese state neglects the fact that Taiwan is
not a homogeneous Han-Chinese society, but rather a multi-cultural, ethnic, and
racial one, even though the Aboriginal peoples constitute only 1.7% of the
total population (Shih, 2000b).
It is not yet unequivocal whether Chen is
a sincere peacemaker or not. Self-claimed as an assertively Taiwanese Nixon,
Chen does enjoy the advantage of being a native Taiwanese, which both Soong,
and, to a less degree, Lien lack. Recalling how Chen had scorned Hsu for his
policy of “Bold Expedition Westwards" four year earlier and how supporters
of the DPP, especially those pro-independence elements, had persistently
condemned the pro-unification New Party for its Functionalist/Neo-Functionalist
position of trade liberalization with China, one is puzzled how they had
reconciled their own obviously double standards . It is highly probable that
Chen was pardoned because of his ethnic Holo
Taiwanese identity while Hsu was distrusted for his Hakka ethnic background.
However, when come to the issue of Nuclear Power Plant IV, Chen's swaying, the cotermination of national identity and ethnic identity had
failed to come to his rescue.
Personal Characteristics
In terms of belief system, Chen Shui-Bian has
repeatedly spelled out that only the Taiwanese have the right to choose the
option that may change the status quo, including not only independence but
unification also. As a matter of fact, this statement is amount to implicitly
professing that the Taiwanese are entitled to the right to self-determination.
Without unconcealed platform as a contract with the voters, he is so far a
quasi-nationalist at best.
Although Chen may not be experienced in
foreign affairs as most DPP elites since they have been in the opposition, it
is not fair the say that he is not interested in
China policy since he was one of few DPP legislators who actively participated
in the first bill regulating cross-strait interactions . Chen also prided
himself on having drafted a basic law between the ROC and the PRC in 1990
(CHEN, 2000: 70). As Chen is specialized in maritime law and an adviser to the
Evergreen Group, which has had business stake in cross-strait transport, it
would be natural for him to be attentive to "mainland affairs." At
issue would be to what extent those native Taiwanese enterprises have so far
influenced policymaking in this particularly sensitive area
.
Still, lack of experience in foreign
affairs may have been conducive to misjudgment of the messages transmitted by
China or the US. For instance, it is still a puzzle how he has come the
conclusion that the US is opposed to Taiwan's de jure independence (CHEN, 2000,
117), which in turn explains why he has repeatedly assured that he would not
categorically declare Taiwan's independence. Similarly, the wide-eyed leaders
of the DPP had earlier naively misinterpreted the good-cop and bad-cop play
between Congress and the White House so far as to look apathetic toward the
heavily lobbied Taiwan Security Enhancement Act passed by the House of the Representatives .
Similarly, his "Integration Discourse"
seemed to have been built on his optimistic misperception that globalization
has heralded the end of the nation-state and hence the declining importance of
sovereignty. Seemingly having been impressed by the dramatic process of
integration in Western Europe, he appears to optimistically believe that the
experience of spillover in the European Union may be applied to cross strait
relations. Of course, it may be another instance of temporary appeasement to
China.
To be welled prepared for the reelection
this time, he has the exact motivation to stabilize external conditions before
he is able to prove to the voters as a reliable administrator. Therefore, it is
imperative to pose himself as a reliable DPP Taiwanese president to China. No
gesture of goodwill seems enough to him .
In recent years, the DPP, in its determination to take over the regime form the
KMT, which is understandable for an adolescent party, has made all attempts to
improve its image supposedly tarnished by the media, including its China
policy. During his tenure as the Taipei mayor (1994-98), the ruthless Chen was
defamed as one with authoritarian and dogmatic personalities by the mainstream
media. Recurrently promising that he would not declare independence before and
after the election, Chen has being calculating to win over some fictitious
median voters hidden in multiple issue spaces, hopefully through moderate
representation in the somewhat skewed media. Again, it testifies that he is
preparing for the next election.
As a lawyer by training, Chen is in
essence as pragmatic as any politician would. This businesslike style would be
reflected in his intentional appease-all policy. For instance, his "Seven
Items（陳七項）" policy toward
China is said to purposely integrate everything, including the view of former
President Lee Teng-hui's "Six Principles（李六條）," and, what is most
astonishing, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's
"Eight Points（江八點）", whence both
pro-independence and pro-unification elements may selectively grab whatever they
like to hear.
For the risk-aversion Chen, safeguarding
the status quo seems to be the most secure road to the presidency.
Rhetorically, as Lee had the notion of a "special state-to-state
relationship," Chen would coin the slogan of "special relationship
between states." In the same manner, when China and the opposition parties
are engulfed in the dogma of "One China, Defined Respectively," Chen
did not hesitate to respond with "Respectively Defined One China（各自表述一個中國）.
Time and again, Chen would enjoy stipulate
some prefixes or suffixes as the preconditions to formal resolutions proposed
by his colleagues, for instance, the "Four If's" to the DPP "417
Resolution" in 1988 , and the "plebiscite" addendum to the TIC
in the Party Program. For Chen, the goal of Taiwan independence is conditional,
that is only if China invades Taiwan. Since China has repeatedly threatened
that if Taiwan declares its independence, it will unwaveringly invade Taiwan,
Chen's rhetoric is intrinsically the mirror opposite of the Chinese
intimidation. Recalling that Chen himself had buoyantly pledged in 1988 that if
China would attack Taiwan, Taiwan would declare independence, all these
conditionals added up can only logically come to one biconditional
equivalence: "Taiwan independence is equal to Chinese invasion." In
this sense, Chen has insidiously changed its underlying orientation toward
China.
Tentative Conclusions
As he has been busying demonstrating his willingness to negotiate an acceptable
political arrangement of the so-called "One-China" formula thrust
upon forcefully by China, it is curious if Taiwan's quasi-allies, the US and
Japan, are ready or not to accept Taiwan's likely association with China even
under the most detached Commonwealth of the Great Chinese sphere of influence.
Not to mention if the Taiwanese are inclined to embrace any integration with
China, unless he is contemplating to use these assurances to buy some time for
Taiwan.
While the party system is still highly
volatile, Chen has the very reason to mystify his China policy as other
competitors have. Nether could factional politics
within the DPP counter his reconciliatory attitudes toward China as Chen has
the abundant resources from the state apparatus. Actually, most factions are
reconciling themselves to the general predisposition of appeasement. As a
native Taiwanese, Chen is endowed with the coterminous cleavages of national
identity and ethnic identity. He thus is immune from the charge of Taiwanese
traitor. In Chen's pragmatic view, the issue of
"independence-or-unification" is not a matter of true-or-false or
multiple-choice, but rather a fill-in question left for the voters to decide
just as they go to the department stores. While determined to succeed in winning
the reelection this time, Chen seems to be convicted that maintaining the
status quo is the best electoral strategy. What is deliberately left out is his
vision of Taiwan's future.
With executive power finally in hand, Chen
has not many excuses except to stand firm on his policy positions. As the
national leader, not merely the administrator, he needs to show that he is
seriously committed to policy. Moreover, he needs to learn to lead, rather than
to follow, the public opinion. Any more wavering is going to cost his
integrity.
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